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A LIFE IN THE CRAFf OF
COMPARATIVE LAW
John C. Reitz*
THOUGHTS FROM A B RIDGE: A RETROSPECTIVE ON NEW EUROPE
AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM. By Eric Stein. Ann Arbor: University

of Michigan Press. 2000. Pp. xvii, 497. $69.50.

It is obvious to specialists in the law of the European Union
("E.U.") - a relatively small but steadily growing group in the United
States - that a "retrospective" collection of Eric Stein's1 writings
would be of great interest. From his 1955 article in the Columbia Law
Review, the first article about the Court of Justice of the European
Coal and Steel Community to appear in English (p. 473), he has been
one of the dominant U.S. scholars of what was initially called
"European Community" ("E.C.") law after the three original
European Communities2 and more recently has been rechristened
"European Union" law after the creation of the E.U. around and on
top ofl the original Communities in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992.4
But this book, which won the 2001 University of Michigan Press Book
Award, deserves a much wider readership. It is a fine collection of the
craft of comparative law, covering much more than E.U. law, and it
also has a very personal aspect that makes it a rich memento of the
author and many of the people with whom he has worked.
It may be foolhardy to write a review of a book that comes with a
"built-in" review, so to speak, and one that says with great acumen
most of the really important things that should be said about Stein's
work. Joseph Weiler, another distinguished E.U. scholar and former
*
Professor and Associate Dean for International and Comparative Law Programs,
University of Iowa College of Law. B.A. 1970, Harvard; J.D. 1975, University of Michigan.
- Ed. I would like to thank Alexander Somek for his helpful comments.

1. Hessel E. Yntema Professor Emeritus of Law at the University of Michigan Law
School.
2. The European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community
("EEC"), and the European Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom").
3. The architecture of Europe is complicated. The three original Communities have
been preserved, but their principal organs have been merged by the Merger Treaty of 1965,
and the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992 rechristened the EEC the European Community
("E.C.") and formed all three Communities into the first of three "Pillars" of the E.U.,
which is sometimes referred to as the "roof." You do not need to understand this in the least
to follow the rest of my Review.
4. Stein has published ... some sixty" pieces on European integration. P. 9.
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colleague of Stein's, has written a Foreword (p. ix) with his customary
exuberance and insight that neatly exposes the deepest values of
Stein's work with an inimitable and compelling style.5 Yet, while
warmly commending Weiler's Foreword to the reader, I will venture
another review, but from a slightly different angle. After a brief over
view of the book and its special personal elements, I will focus on
some specific aspects of Stein's comparative law craftsmanship and
conclude by discussing two of the general issues about divided-powers
systems that are raised by the materials in the book.
I.

OVERVIEW O F T H E B OOK AND ITS PERSONAL ELEMENTS

The collection is "retrospective" not only in the sense of a selec
tion of some of Stein's finest work over a career spanning more than
half a century, but also in the sense that Stein has annotated each
piece with a short introduction putting the piece in context both within
his own career and the other pieces in the volume, as well as sketching
out some of the major legal developments since the original date of
publication that would have to be taken into account in updating to
the publication of this volume (2000).6. The method of updating and
commenting on the original text · through introductory notes gives the
book a touch of the Talmud or Gothofredus' Digest and postmodern
ism at the same time. It should be noted, however, that the book is not
meant to be a summing up of Stein's career. There are important as
pects that are not touched upon by the materials in the book. For ex
ample, in addition to a heavy focus on E.U. law, Stein had a substan
tial career as a public international lawyer for the U.S. government
before coming to Michigan to teach, and thereafter he continued to be
involved in international law, teaching and writing especially about
arms control.
The book is divided into a short "Introduction," three major sec
tions, and a short "Coda." The Introduction sounds the main theme in
its title, "Five Variations on a Theme: Divided-Power Systems." Part
1, entitled "Constitutionalizing, Harmonizing," is focused on the
E.C./E.U. and contains a classic piece on E.U. law which makes a fine
introduction to E.U. law and hence ought to be considered for inclu
sion in teaching materials. The article, "Lawyers, Judges, and the
Making of a Transnational Constitution," is his 1981 study of the role
of the European Court of Justice in advancing European integration
(p. 15). It focuses on the seminal cases in which the Court enunciated
5. For another short, perceptive review, see Richard B. Bilder & George A. Bermann,
Book Review, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 826 (2000).

6. Although Stein expressly disclaims any thoroughgoing effort to update, p. 11, he also
added footnotes in some places or expanded original footnotes to provide information about
subsequent legal developments.
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the key integrating doctrines (supremacy of Community law and direct
effects, as well as the scope of the treaty-making power) that have so
lidified the powers of the then-E.C. government. The other essay in
Part 1 is a 1971 study of the making of the First Coordination
Directive, the first exercise of Commul!ity power to coordinate mem
ber state law, in this case on the subject of corporation (in the E.C.
called "company") law (p. 50).
The second part of the book, which contains the most explicitly
comparative pieces about the E.U. and is appropriately entitled
"European Integration and the American Federal Experience," begins
with his classic 1977 essay on "Uses, Misuses - and . Nonuses of
Comparative Law" (p. 89), a general essay on the subject, which nicely
states the promise of comparative studies and gives a still largely accu
rate assessment of the relative non-use of comparative law in the
United States. Part Two also contains another classic piece worthy of
consideration as an introduction to E.C./E.U. law, the magisterial
comparison of the E.C. with the U.S. federal system, specially focusing
on free movement of goods and persons (p. 1 12), which he coauthored
with his Michigan colleague Terrance Sandalow for the 1982 book
they jointly edited entitled Courts and Free Markets - Perspectives
from the United States and Europe. The introductory note Stein wrote
for that piece includes a page-length quotation from the introduction
European Court of Justice ("ECJ") Judge Pierre Pescatore wrote for
the 1982 book (pp. 1 13-14). Other selections in this part include a 1976
comparative study of standing under E.C. and U.S. federal law which
Stein co-authored with Michigan colleague Joseph Vining (p. 161); a
1986 comparison of the foreign affairs powers under U.S. and E.C. law
(p. 191), on which he collaborated with Columbia professor Louis
Henkin; a guest editorial he published in the Common Market Law
Review in 1992 entitled "Foreign Policy at Maastricht: 'Non in Com
motione Dominus' " (p. 304); a study of the forces for uniformity
within the U.S. federal system (p. 309), also published in 1986; and a
previously unpublished statement on Democracy without "a People,"
which he presented at conferences in 1998 and 1999.
The selections in the third part (entitled "Europe's Burden of His
tory") are not about E.U. law. They include his 1989 essay (p. 347) on
the German criminal laws that have been interpreted to proscribe
public statements propagating the so-called "Auschwitz lie," the claim
that the Holocaust never happened; a collection of never-before pub�
lished correspondence Stein received in reply to earlier published ver
sions of that essay (p. 410); and selections from his 1997 book on the
breakup of Czechoslovakia (p. 417). The "Coda" contains some short
remarks entitled \'Reminiscences of the Embryonic EEC," which he
gave at a dinner in Villa Montaldo, Florence, in 1989 in celebration of
his seventy-fifth birthday (p. 471) and some stylish remarks his wife

/
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Virginia Stein gave, apparently at the same occasion, entitled · "A
Million Footnotes" (pp. 476-77).
The book thus consists of major studies Stein has already pub
lished, either alone or with others, one going back as far as 1971, sup
plemented by a number of statements from personal friends and col
leagues of long standing, some relevant documentation (the
correspondence on the "Auschwitz lie" issue), an editorial he wrote,
an unpublished conference statement, an after-dinner speech, and
some autobiographical writing. The autobiographical information
comes chiefly in the introduction and coda and in the introductory
notes he wrote for each essay, which often discuss how he came to un
dertake the particular study and how he saw it relating to his previous
or subsequent work. The excerpt from the Preface to .his book on the
break-up of Czechoslovakia also describes his connection to that coun
try (he was born, raised, and received his first law degree there), how
he left in the wake of the German occupation in 1939, how he re
turned years later and was able to attend the fiftieth reunion of his
high school (gymnasium) class only to witness the way that commu
nism had wasted the lives of many of his classmates, how he left de
termined never to return, and how he nevertheless came to return to
provide assistance in the preparation of a new constitution after the
collapse of communism (pp. 418-19).
The intrusion of such a personal note may seem espeeially sur
prising once you know Stein's writing style, of which Joseph Weiler
quite accurately says in his Foreword that it "provides powerfully pro
bative evidence for the qualities of temperance, suppression of the
personal and the subjective in favor of a disciplined, rational dis
course" (p. xiii). For that very reason, I am grateful for the more per
sonal tone of the book. Something of the warm smile and engaged
look of concern with which he greets students and former students
shines through the pages, though in truth the book still provides only
glimpses. The book is also a celebration of the rich human ties he has
had in his professional life. The number of colleagues who have col
laborated with him, either as coauthor, commentator on a draft, sup
plier of information or perspective which is documented in a footnote,
or in some more organizational way is truly impressive, and his intro
ductory notes tend to document the human connections in some de
tail. There is no doubt that Stein's ability to work with others is a very
important ability which has contributed to the strength of his scholar
ship.
II.

COMPARATIVE LAW CRAFfSMANSHIP

I had the privilege in the mid-1970s to be a student in Eric Stein's
class on what was then called, according to my still extant class notes,
"Common Market Law." To this day, I remember being struck at the
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end of the course by the realization that, despite my expectation that
the course would be about the law of another system, I found that I
had also had a really good comparative law course, and as always
should be true of comparative study, I came away from that course
with a much better understanding of our own system, especially the
aspect of federalism. Readers of this book will, I think, have a similar
experience because Stein is a master comparatist. There are at least
four virtues in his craft which are worth reflecting on.
First, Stein's work is never simplistic. Comparative work has been
chided for the tendency to reduce law to a narrow positivist version by
being satisfied with simple comparisons of a statutory scheme from
one country with that of another. It is an understandable tendency be
cause positive law is the easiest to identify and limiting one's attention
to that level of law keeps the comparative task quite manageable. In
any event, good legal analysis has to start with the written texts of law.
But what good lawyer is satisfied to describe only the positive law?
The whole interest of law - its whole soul
lies in the possibilities
that are created by what positive law does not say, by its gaps. Stein's
consummate legal professionalism shows, for example, in the way he
examines the U.S. law that would be relevant . to deciding whether to
uphold laws like the German laws that criminalize the propagation of
the "Auschwitz lie" (pp. 382-86). He discusses the main U.S. Supreme
Court decisions up to the time of original publication of the essay
(1989). He describes the controversy involving Skokie, Illinois, where
a neo-Nazi party applied for a permit to march in that heavily-Jewish
town and the permit was denied on the basis of town ordinances sup
pressing hate speech. The Illinois state and lower federal courts struck
down the ordinances as violations of the First Amendment and the
U.S. Supreme Court refused review. Stein is certainly on solid ground
to conclude that U.S. law is not likely to uphold the German-style
laws. But as he says, "[i]n reality, neither the language of the free
speech clause of the First Amendment nor its history, nor for that mat"
ter - prior case law, unequivocally foreclose considerations of any
claim to regulate extremist speech that defames religious or racial
groups and advocates a violent regime" (p. 385). In that spirit of
openness, he examines the academic discourse after the Skokie case,
especially the arguments by Lee Bollinger who, reacting to the consid
erable controversy within the U.S. over that case, attempted to pro
vide a new and better justification for such a policy of strong toler
ance. In his search to understand U.S. law on the point, Stein has thus
tried to take into account the expressions of all important authorities
in the legal community, especially the scholars, whose voices are an
important part of the on-going debate about what the law is.
__,.
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In Professor Rudolf Sacco's terms, Stein's work takes into account
all the "legal formants."7 So too, in discussing the German laws in
question, Stein not only examines statutory texts and court decisions,
but also scholarly writing and the public debates, which in the case of
passage of a new statute on the matter were carried out largely be
tween the political parties, and he subjects the logic of the case deci
sions to his own searching critique (pp. 349-80). Similarly, his treat
ment of the famous van Gend case at the European Court of Justice
examines the different ways the argument could have gone and thus
supports his claim that the Court was making law there (pp. 18-24).
This quality of Stein's craft makes his work retain its significance long
after the law it treats has become outdated, just as we study and teach
old cases, even if they have been overruled, to learn how great lawyers
of the past have conducted their craft of lawyering.
Second, Stein makes extensive use of models or theoretical con
structs. Stein does this so much that I can give only a few examples
here. A consistent theme of his writing has been to examine the de
gree to which the E.C./E.U. is a type of federal system. Thus he was
among the first scholars to treat the E.C., not as an institution of in
ternational law, but as an emerging domestic legal order in which the
ECJ makes constitutional decisions - in other words, to hold the E.C.
treaty up to the model of a national constitution (pp. 4-5) and thus the
ECJ up to the model of a supreme or constitutional court. In consid
ering the "Uses, Misuses - and Nonuses of Comparative Law"
(p. 89), Stein devotes over half of the piece to a consideration of com
peting theories of legal borrowing by Otto Kahn-Freund and Alan
Watson and then tests those theories by applying them to the efforts
within Europe at transplanting company law.
Stein's closing study on the dissolution of Czechoslovakia makes
perhaps the most extensive use of models and theories, especially from
political science. As a possible basis for understanding ethnic conflict,
Stein cites, for example, the work of American sociologist/lawyer
Donald L. Horowitz (p. 421), who suggested that ethnic conflict may
result from "cultural differences" or "ignorance or realistic divergence
of interests" (pp. 421, 423). Stein uses that dichotomy throughout his
analysis of the breakup to show that both cultural differences and ig
norance (and resultant resentment) played their respective roles. In
discussing the progress of transformation in Czech and Slovak lands
from Communism to free market democracy, Stein cites a number of
the leading writers on the issue of whether the transition to democracy
together with constitution drafting should precede the transition to the
7. Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (Install
ment I of II), 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1991); Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Ap
proach to Comparative Law (Installment II of II), 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 343 (1991); see espe
cially Sacco (Installment I), supra, at 22.

May 2002]

The Craft of Comparative Law

1459

market, come after it, or take place at the same time. Stein makes a
plausible case that in fact in most if not all of the post-Soviet countries
of Eastern and Central Europe, constitution-making has been pursued
through legislation and court decision even if no new constitution was
formally adopted (p. 438), so that one should not point to this region
of the world as evidence that political reform should be postponed un
til after economic reform. In discussing the role of civil society in these
transformations, Stein notes Robert Putnam's work concerning the
hypothesis that good government and political-economic progress de
pend on the formation of many small-scale associations, and Stein
concludes from data about the extent of civil societies in both the
Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic that "the data appear to
support Putnam's correlation between a civil society of vibrant private
groupings and good government" (p. 440).
Stein's pervasive use of models and theory makes his work inter
disciplinary and lends it analytic muscle. An old criticism of compara
tive law holds that it is primarily descriptive, not analytic. I have al
ready pointed out how analytic Stein's comparative work is with
regard to the way he explores the possibilities of legal doctrine, but
much comparative writing is not about doctrine. Stein shows that de
scriptions of governmental structures or of legal reform can also be
made highly analytic by basing the description on theoretical models.
As Stein recognizes (p. 112), models also facilitate comparison by pro
viding a tertium comparationis or abstract statement of the subject of
comparison so that exactly what is being compared to what is clear.
They can also introduce a comparative element into a description of
the law of a single country. Another complaint about comparative law
is that so much of it is not comparative at all but rather a mere descrip
tion of foreign law. That is not necessarily bad in and of itself - the
foreign law may be very interesting - but such writing does fail to get
the analytic advantages of the comparative method. When Stein writes
a piece focused, for example, solely on the law of the former
Czechoslovakia, his use of theoretical models like Putnam's theory of
civil society, which Putnam developed in a study of Italy and has ap
plied to the United States, implicitly introduces a comparative element
and gives his description, with respect to the subject of the model,
much if not all of the analytic power that an expressly comparative
treatment would.
Third, Stein's work gains great clarity by being concrete. It thus
makes clear the relationship between law and life. Despite his power
ful use of models and theories for analysis, the treatment is not aridly
abstract. Stein avoids that vice through the use of concrete examples
and good use of data about the social reality on which law acts. For
example, the essay comparing the law of standing in the United States
and the E.U. deals with that notoriously abstract topic by introducing
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the facts of three actual cases to illustrate the differences between U.S.
and E.U. law (pp. 163-64).
His study of the forces contributing to uniformity within the U.S.
federal system focuses on family law to illustrate its themes. In de
scribing how the U.S. federal system has handled both divorce and
non-payment of child support, Stein uses statistics to give the reader
some idea of the extent of the problems (pp. 320, 322). He uses the
harmonization of company law to test the different theories about
transplanting law (p. 98). Stein studied the making of the first E.C.
harmonization of company law . as a way of illustrating and under
standing the workings (and dysfunctions) of the original E.C. law
making . process (p. 50). As he says in his introductory note to that
study, "Searching behind the fa<;ade of technical argumentation, I dis
cerned a colorful world of public and private groups pressing a variety
of political, economic, professional, and class interests, fiercely pro
tecting institutional 'turfs' and indigenous legal traditions, as well as
private individuals with their own ambitions" (p. 51). It is this search
ing for the connection between law and the life on which it purports to
operate that makes Stein's work so interesting to read.
Fourth, Stein's treatment of foreign law is grounded in fundamen
tal respect for the Other. Weiler has already described this quality of
Stein's work with great eloquence in his Foreword (pp. xiv-xv). It
seems to me to be an absolute prerequisite for serious comparative
study. Unless you are willing to accord the Other full respect, how can
you take seriously the Other's legal system when it differs from your
own in some fundamental respects? When you do accord the Other's
legal system respect, you can criticize it just as if it were your system
because you are taking it seriously. This quality permits Stein, for ex
ample, to write a study of the German laws criminalizing the
"Auschwitz lie" which enables U.S. lawyers to understand the sense of
these laws in the context of German history and the rest of German
law even though they are so at odds with our own strong commitment
to free speech. He even helps the U.S. lawyer see how the laws can be
criticized from within the German legal tradition so that we as outsid
ers can appreciate the robustness of the German legal discourse. Of
course, in this respect Stein is perhaps ideally qualified to be a com
paratist. Born and raised in Czechoslovakia, educated as a lawyer both
there and again at Michigan, and having worked his entire profes
sional career as a lawyer in the United States, he personally has been a
bridge between Europe and the United States. He is, as Weiler says,
"utterly at home in America, utterly at home in Europe" (p. xiv).
There is no question about his insider-status as a U.S. lawyer. When
he departs from his usual even-handed stance by making his opinion
clear that U.S. law has gone too far toward protecting free speech at
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the expense of protecting community,8 the mere expression of his
opinion lends it a particular force, but it is a criticism from within U.S.
law. Yet, he has also enabled us to appreciate how we are different
from a very foreign legal system and - in the space opened up within
our own system by the possibility of critique arising from within our
own system - how we are also to an important extent similar, as well.
As all good comparative writing should do, he has taken us with him
across a bridge.
Ill. SOME ISSUES RELATING TO DIVIDED POWER SYSTEMS

In view of the title of Stein's introductory essay to the book, Five
Variations on a Theme: Divided-Power Systems, it may surprise the
reader that the book offers no extended theoretical investigation of
divided-power systems. In view of Stein's affinity for theoretic models,
it may seem surprising that the book contains no discussion of federal
versus confederal systems or how they compare to unitary states with
autonomous regions or significant devolution of power to local
authorities. Stein has a clear interest in theory, but the focus of his
work is on careflll studies about concrete aspects of the subject. Per
haps he felt that it was not yet time for grand theory or comprehensive
treatment. The last several decades of the twentieth century have been
a time of extraordinary activity and creativity in this field. Not only
have new international organizations been created, most notably the
World Trade Organization ("WTO"), but there has also been an ex
traordinary wave of constitution drafting around the world, especially
in the wake of the collapse of communism in Eastern and Central
Europe and Eurasia. We now have many more divided-power systems
to study.
As a way of demonstrating the richness of Stein's studies and en
gaging in scholarly dialogue with him,9 I would like to comment on
two important issues that appear in his work but that would be impor
tant to understand better in order to develop a more comprehensive
theory of divided-power systems.
A. The Integrating Force of the Economy
One conventional understanding of the growth of the E.C., now
E.U., is that the substantial political unity that has been achieved has
been made possible, or at least greatly strengthened, by the substantial
8. Stein's opinion is still somewhat indirectly expressed. Stein closes the essay with this
pointed question: "What is one to think of a law that pleads inability to distinguish between
neo-Nazis parading through Skokie and civil-rights advocates marching through white-racist
neighborhoods in the South?" P. 388.
·

9. Stein remains a very productive scholar despite his "retirement" in 1983. Roughly
half of the selections included in Thoughts from a Bridge were first published after 1983.
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economic integration that has been achieved in Europe. The story to
date is quite wondrous. Who would have thought in the 50s, 60s, or
even the 70s and 80s that by the beginning of the twenty-first century a
substantial part of the E.U. would have achieved a currency union and
the dismantling of virtually all E.U.-internal border controls on the
continent of Europe. Surely substantial economic benefits from a
common market in Europe, with freedom of movement for goods, la
bor, establishment, and capital, have contributed to the political ac
ceptability of the substantial political integration that has followed in
the wake of market integration.
The articles included in Thoughts from a Bridge tend to focus more
on legal and political integration than on economic integration, but I
suspect that Stein would agree with the conventional understanding
because in the excerpts from his book on the dissolution of
Czechoslovakia, he asks explicitly why the economic forces were not
sufficient to hold the union of Czechs and Slovaks together
(pp. 426-28). As in the E.U., but on a smaller scale, the larger domestic
market should have been attractive to businesses large enough to ex
ploit it because, as a general rule, the larger the market available to
them under one set of rules, the lower their costs.
So why in the case of Czechoslovakia did the pressures for dissolu
tion override the economic pressure in favor of integration? Stein can
vasses a number of answers. First, the economic benefits of the larger
state are only attractive to domestic business if there are business enti
ties capable of taking advantage of the larger market. There appar
ently were none in either the Slovak or the Czech Republic at the time
of dissolution.10 Second, there were countervailing economic pres
sures. The Slovak economy included many more large Soviet-style fac
tories, especially ones involved in weapons production. The Slovak
economy therefore suffered disproportionately from the loss of east
ern markets for these large industrial enterprises and the central gov
ernment's decision early in the transition period to terminate weapons
production. Moreover, because of their size, they were particularly dif
ficult to restructure, and the central government's attempts at radical
restructuring had much more serious social impact in Slovakia than in
the rest of the country. From the Slovak side, economic factors ap
peared to argue for dissolution, not union (p. 427). From the Czech
side, there were also important economic/political pressures against
union. Prime Minister Klaus was concerned that the economic trans
formation in the Czech Republic would be impaired by special policies
being demanded to deal with the problems of the huge former defense

10. P. 427 n.13 (citing Ellen Comisso, Federalism and Nationalism in Post-Socialist
Eastern Europe (1992) (unpublished paper for a symposium on "Federalism for the New
Europe," Benjamin Cardozo School of Law, New York (Sept. 10-12, 1992)).
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industries in Slovakia, and Czechs in general were tired of the feeling .
that they were "subsidizing" the Slovaks (p. 428).
Stein also points to the influence of numerous other factors push
ing the two states apart, for example, the awkwardness of a union of
two polities in which there was an understandable claim for equal
treatment by each entity, yet one had twice the population of the other
(pp. 424-25); two key players, Czech Republic Prime Minister Vaclav
Klaus and his Slovak counterpart Vladimir Meciar, both of whom
pushed for dissolution (pp. 425-26); the media, which failed to calm
the nationalistic rhetoric on either side (pp. 428-29); the lack of inter
national pressure to stay together (pp. 429-30). But what Stein labels
as the "primary cause" (pp. 423-24) was ethnic conflict. Despite having
closely similar languages and living standards, the Slovaks had been
under what they felt to be oppressive Hungarian rule at the end of the
Hapsburg monarchy and emerged at the time of the first
Czechoslovak Republic in 1918 "some half a century behind the
Czechs" (p. 424). Since then, Slovaks have felt ignored or looked
down upon by the Czechs and treated as second-class citizens. Al
though this enmity did not result in violence, there was real heat in the
Slovak rejection of union with the Czechs, and Stein appears to regard
this factor as the most important one in the break-up.
Could economics have trumped ethnic conflict? It is hard to know
since according to Stein's account, neither side perceived a strong eco
nomic advantage in staying together. Still, the reasons for ethnic dis
cord also seem mild by world standards, which usually involve long
and bloody histories of violence. The reasons for ethnic conflict were
certainly mild by comparison with the reasons for enmity between, for
example, France and Germany at the start of the E.C. in the wake of
World War II. Another factor Stein offers to explain the break-up of
Czechoslovakia is the timing with which the ethnic grievances could be
aired, and this may have been the crucial factor. In Western Europe,
before the ties of the E.C. began to be developed and strengthened
much beyond that of a simple customs union, there was opportunity
for free discussion about enmities, ancient and recent. In Eastern
Europe, by contrast, the Soviet yoke had suppressed all expression of
ethnic discord after the war, and the Slovaks and Czechs could not air
their mutual grievances until the collapse of communism after 1989.
The sudden opportunity to air them seems to have stoked the flames
of discord the way a fire that has been deprived of oxygen will flare up
when suddenly given more air. One wonders whether the results might
have been different if international pressure, for example, had forced
events in Czechoslovakia to slow down.
One also wonders about the relationship between union at the re
gional or world level and break-up of small countries like
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Czechoslovakia. Stein says, "the increasingly liberalized international
economy has reduced the allure of the larger domestic market . . . . " 1 1
It also appears that at least some Czechs and Slovaks supporting dis
solution did so because they hope to see both the Czech and Slovak
Republics becoming members of the E.U. (p. 430). Is this evidence of
the real success of the idea of European Union - that it begins to
make nationhood seem irrelevant? But if this logic operated to hasten
the dissolution of a nation-state, could the same logic operate against
the E.U.? Is it possible that if the WTO has reasonable success in ex
panding free trade to services and maybe even beyond to labor and
capital, that its very success might begin to convince individual nations
that they need not be part of the E.U.? Or are all these unions vulner
able to dissolution if they are based solely on economics and not on
some ethnic or cultural affinity?
B.

Europe and America as Models for Each Other: The Significance
of Differences in Political Economy

Comparison always raises at least implicitly the normative question
whether one country's law should be taken as a model for another's.
Eschewing simplistic notions, Stein has never suggested that the U.S.
version of federalism should simply be copied by the E.U. Neverthe
less, Stein's work comparing the degree of integration in the E.U. to
the U.S. federal system raises the question to what extent U.S. law
might serve in any degree as a model for Europe. In like manner, his
verdict that American law is too extreme in its protection of free
speech,12 raises the question to what extent Europe should serve as a
model for the United States.
Stein recognizes, of course, important differences between Europe
and the United States that might show why the law comes to different
answers on both sides of the Atlantic. With respect to free speech is
sues, he mentions the very different histories, including a much longer
tradition of democracy and constitutional government and a greater
sense of national security in the United States than in Germany, the
significance of the civil rights movement in the United States, the
greater diversity that the U.S. society has traditionally had as com
pared with European societies and the "melting pot" theory with
which America has traditionally greeted immigration (pp. 386-88).
These are no doubt important for understanding the greater willing
ness in the United States to protect speech that stirs up racial or ethnic
hatred. But I think that he puts his finger directly on the nub of the
matter when he raises the question whether courts or legislatures
11. P. 427 (citing Cornisso, supra note 10).
12. See supra note 8.
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should play the larger role in deciding these kinds of issues. That ques
tion, Stein says, "goes beyond the institutional concerns to the prob
lem of fundamental values" because it implicates the debate between
liberals and communitarians (p. 388). "[F]orbidding localities to inter
fere with the public advocacy of group hatred affirms individual lib
erty, but denies the political community the opportunity to express
through law the central commitment and ideals that unite its mem
bers. "13
Political economy, which is itself a product of the historical and so
cial factors, is thus an important dimension of the issue. The lack of
willingness to permit communities to regulate hate speech reflects not
only the very high value the American polity places on freedom of
speech, but also the great skepticism with which it tends to regard
government regulation of any kind. The German interpretation of
their criminal laws to prohibit the "Auschwitz lie" reflects a polity that
is much more accepting of government regulation of all kinds.
The difference reveals a kind of "irony" of political economy: The
individual-based, market-centered political economy of the United
States is less capable of protecting the individuals in society from ex
tremist hate-mongers than is a more state-centered political economy
which is more willing to accept the use of state regulatory power for
the benefit of society as a whole. Too much emphasis on individualism
thus threatens to isolate the individual precisely because it challenges
the power of the communities that groups create in order· to protect
themselves from other individuals or groups.
Within a given country people differ with respect to where the bal
ance should be struck: more in favor of the individual and hence of the
market, or more in favor of the community and hence of the state. But
I also believe that countries tend to show surprising consistency with
respect to whether a more state-centered or a more market-centered
political economy generally prevails. Moreover, I have argued, these
differences have profound consequences for their respective legal sys
tems, including matters of public law such as the conceptions of the
state, constitutional rights, and the judicial office, and standing and
related topics concerning the participation of the public in the proc
esses of administrative formulation of and enforcement of law.14 If I
am right, differences in political economy need to be taken into ac
count in any analysis of types of divided-power systems. Stein and his
coauthor Sandalow recognize the influence of differences of political
economy in the excerpt from their book Courts and Markets - Per
spectives from the United States and Europe. In their list of factors that
13. P. 388 (quoting Note, A Communitarian Defense of Group Libel Laws, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 682, 683 (1988)).
14. John C. Reitz, Political Economy as a Major Architectural Principle of Public Law,
75 TuL. L. REV. 1121 (2001).
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explain why they do not believe that the E.U. will model itself on U.S.
federalism, political economy plays a prominent role. For example,
they write that "the contemporary European welfare state systems
postulate intensive government intervention in the economy
"
(p. 117). Speaking of the American Republic at the time of Chief
Justice John Marshall, Stein and Sandalow say, "the new Republic,
endowed with natural resources vastly superior to those of Western
Europe, functioned in a laissez-faire market economy that offered
substantially fewer opportunities for confrontations between state and
central institutions than are generated by 'welfare state' economies"
(p. 117).
What more can we say about the relationship between political
economy and the form of divided-power systems? I have suggested
that state-centered political economies should be more willing to con
centrate state power, in order to facilitate state action - something
which is necessary if the state is to be assigned significant responsibili
ties for providing for the general welfare - whereas the more market
centered political economies ought in ·general to be more receptive of
forms that distribute power and particularly of forms of "checks and
balances" in which more than one branch or level of government is
required to agree before the government can take action on behalf of
the state. The possibility that the checks and balances will prevent or
slow down government action is less objectionable in a system that is
fundamentally skeptical about government action and does not assign
the government a leading role in securing the general welfare.15
But that idea could be implemented in many different ways. In a
divided-powers system, powers can be distributed between the con
stituent parts and the central government (what we normally mean by
"federalism") or among the different branches of the central govern
ment (what we normally mean by "separation of powers"), or by vari
ous combinations of both. The fact that the United States and
Germany are both federal systems suggests that there is no necessary
correlation between political · economy and forms of divided-power
systems. But these two federal systems also show some intriguing dif
ferences. The way in which the U.S. federal system often permits fed
eral, state, and even local jurisdictions to overlap and regulate aspects
of the same activity or place justifies labeling it "competitive" federal
ism; German federalism is often called "cooperative" federalism from
the way in which the federal and state governments have to work to
gether.16 I am not clear that the U.S.-style "competitive" federalism
necessarily results in · greater distribution of power than the German
version, but it seems at least to result in a different manner of distrib•

15. Id. at 1144-45.
16. Id. at 1147.

.
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uting power. But even if federalism is not found exclusively in the
more market-centered political economies, if my idea has any merit,
one ought to find that the sum total of devices used to diffuse power
are greater in a market-centered political economy and that there is a
greater concentration of state power in state-centered political
economies.
Where does the E.U. fall on the political economy spectrum? It is
not at all clear to me. On the one hand, it might seem likely that a un
ion of European states would reflect the dominant political economy
on the continent of Europe, the relatively more state-centered politi
cal economy of the social welfare state. True, England is a bit of an
anomaly, but my investigations into political economy suggest that
England is much closer to the continental versions of political econ
omy than the United States.17 In any event, virtually all the other
members of the E.U. have fairly strong commitments to the social wel
fare state model. It would not be surprising if the product of their un
ion also manifested a similar commitment to a relatively state
centered political economy. On the other hand, there are reasons to
expect a political economy at the level of E.U. law that would be much
closer to the strongly market-centered political economy of the United
States. One might hypothesize that the development of the market
centered political economy in the United States was influenced in part
by the relative lack of commonality that the various immigrant groups
felt for each other. Individualism may have flourished in part because
different immigrant groups felt that they had little in common with
other groups. If there is any validity to that view of U.S. history, then
it would seem even more likely that the E.U. would develop a similar
kind of · pluralist politics. Like the U.S., the E.U. is the product of a
great mix of peoples, and they are even more divided than the popula
tion of the United States by language and history and still today by
separately constituted states.
The issue may thus have some relation to the much-discussed issue
of the E.U.'s "democratic deficit," which Stein addresses in his "Panel
Statement on Democracy without a People" (p. 335). How can democ
racy be created at the E.U. level when there is no European people
(demos), only the peoples of the member states? The assumption is
that democracy can function well only if the people among whom it is
instituted feel themselves to constitute a community. So too, we might
ask, how could a state-centered political economy be formed at the
E.U. level if there is no community of citizens who see themselves
constituting a people? If there is no European demos, won't the E.U.
inevitably tend away from the state-centered pole of political economy
and toward the market-centered pole? Besides, a key purpose of the

17. Id. at 1130-31.
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E.C. was to promote and facilitate free trade within the European
Community, so a kind of neo-liberal, free-trade bias pervades the
whole project of the E.U.
Surely one effect to date of E.U. law has been to invalidate a large
mass of protective domestic legislation in the name of the principles of
free movement. But at the same time, Member State regulation has to
some extent been replaced by E.U. regulation. Some aspects of E.U.
regulatory policy suggest that the E.U. approach has tended toward
the more state-centered end of the political economy spectrum, like
that of the individual European states. For example, it may at first
blush appear surprising that the Commission has pursued such an in
terventionist competition policy, even promulgating standard-form
contracts for patent licensing, but the interventionism results naturally
from the block-exemption power that the Commission · has in this
area.18 With respect to the collection and transmission of personal
data, the E.U.'s Directive 95/46/EC imposes significant protections for
personal privacy while "the United States has . . . left the protection of
privacy to markets rather than law."19
I do not know enough about current E.U. law to characterize its
political economy with any assurance. More study is needed. More
over, I think that Stein would counsel us to be wary of being overly
rigid in our concepts. With regard to the concern that there is no
"European people," he points out that the E.U. is also not a nation
state. It is something new "that calls for its own idiosyncratic solution"
(p. 342). Stein seems to align himself with those who think that a
European identity can form on top of2° the discrete identities of citi
zens of the member states so that a meaningful form of democracy can
be developed at the E.U. level (p. 343). So too, it is possible that the
E.U. is developing a unique political economy that does not look like
that of any of its member states and that is still quite different from
that of the United States. But whatever form the E.U.'s political econ
omy takes, it is an important feature of the Union which we must bet
ter understand, both in order to better understand the E.U. and in or
der to develop a more comprehensive understanding of divided-power
systems.

18. Imelda Maher, Competition Law and Intellectu.al Property Rights: Evolving Formal
ism, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU' LAw 598, 609-13, 622 (Paul Craig & Grainne de Burca eds.,
1999).

19. Joel R. Reidenberg, £-Commerce and Trans-Atlantic Privacy, 38 Hous. L. REV.
717, 730-31(2001).
20. Problems of E.U. architecture again! See supra note 3.
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* * *

In effect, I have been arguing in this last section to elaborate
Stein's latest model for divided-power systems. In his "Panel
Statement on Democracy without "a People," Stein proposed a model,
based on the democratic liberal state, that had three required compo
nents: (a) "democracy," (b) "constitutionalism" (rule of law and pro
tection of basic individual rights), and (c) "respect for civil society and
market economy" (p. 336). I have in effect been suggesting that we
need further study with regard to the part of (c) that concerns the
market. At a minimum, it seems likely that the citizens of a divided
power system will have little allegiance to a divided-power system un
less they can see themselves as able to gain significant benefits from
the system's market economy, but within the various democratic lib
eral states, there is considerable variation in political economy. In the
current period following the decisive collapse of communism, it is
tempting to assert that at least the very far state-centered end of the
spectrum, the command economy, is not acceptable, if for no other
reason, then on the ground that it threatens to undermine all the other
required components. However, I think it important for theorists of
divided-power systems to hold an open mind on the issue. People are
always going to seek some forms of communalism, and there are no
clear dividing lines along the political economy spectrum. What does
seem clear is that the choice of political economy is likely to be associ
ated with certain choices about the structure of governmental institu
tions and law, so we need to understand the connections better. Stein's
comparative study of divided-power systems has helped put us in posi
tion to take this next step.
These issues about divided-power systems are not just academic
questions. Recent protests against the power of the WTO and concern
about the transparency and participatory quality of its governing proc
esses, as well as the dramatic reconstitution of the social, political and
economic orders of countries emerging from communism show that
we have a current, pressing need to understand these matters better.
Moreover, the astonishing degree of integration in Europe achieved
already in just half a century of the E.C./E.U., as well as the relatively
recent creation of the WTO are major steps toward greater integration
on a worldwide basis. Is it possible that there may soon be opportuni
ties to restructure the whole world order? Stein tells us that over the
years he has turned gladly to the E.C./E.U. as compensation for the
frustrations of trying to deal with the broader problems of world order
(p. 9). I believe, however, that if and when opportunities to restructure
the general world order do open up, we will find that our ability to ad
dress the issues have been materially aided by the fine comparative
work Stein has done, especially as represented in Thoughts from a
Bridge.

